Cayman: a hotspot of zero-taxes, legalised secrecy and "light touch" regulation
The Cayman Islands is ranked fourth in the 2013 Financial SecrecyIndex. Cayman combines a high secrecy score (70 points out of a possible 100) with a large share (almost 5 per cent) of the global market for offshore financial services. Time and again when major scandals emerge into the public spotlight, Cayman seems to be involved in one way or another. As this blog reveals, this is not coincidence.
Cayman
Overview
The Cayman Islands is an Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom. As
such, it operates with considerable political and economic autonomy from the UK,
but with a strong degree of support and oversight from the UK at the same time
– a crucial reassurance for skittish owners of global financial assets. The British
Queen is Head of State and the Governor, appointed by
London, presides over the Cayman cabinet and appoints members of the judiciary
and the police commissioner. The UK has responsibility for defence, foreign
affairs, internal security, the police, the civil service and ‘good
governance’.
Formerly a rather lawless turntable for drugs smuggling and money
laundering, Cayman has steadily moved upmarket and sought to squeeze out some
of the more egregious forms of money laundering – and since our last index in
2011 it has introduced some welcome if limited changes to curb its secrecy
offerings. Yet as our index shows, Cayman still offers a wide range of harmful secrecy
facilities including a law that can lead to prison terms not only for handing
over information to unauthorised parties, but merely for asking for it (5(1)b). Cayman also
offers an array of zero-tax privileges, common with many other tax havens. It
has no direct taxes: most government revenue comes from fees and duties such as
import levies, work permit fees and financial industry registrations. Cayman
also continues to offer the offshore staple of “light-touch” and “flexible”
financial regulation.
Much of Cayman’s business today comes from the world’s biggest banks,
corporations, hedge funds and other entities and arrangements: it has grown
into the world’s fifth biggest financial
services centre, by some accounts, hosting over 10,000
mutual funds, second only to
Luxembourg. It hosts over 200 banks; 140 trust companies managing numerous
trusts and other arrangements; and over 90,000 companies. It is by far the
world’s leading domicile for hedge funds, and the leading
domicile for healthcare captive insurance companies. Financial services account for well over half
of gross domestic product. Official statistics for Cayman are, in places, quite
opaque; the IMF, for
instance, noted a major mis-match between Cayman’s $2.2 trillion in hedge fund
assets and its merely $768bn in portfolio equity claims.
The story: how
Cayman became a tax haven
Like many islands in the Caribbean, the Cayman Islands served as an
“offshore” pirate sanctuary as early as the 18th Century – though by
no means the largest one. Its status as a tax haven today is the result of
deliberate steps taken from the late 1950s, as well as Cayman’s decision to
remain an overseas territory of Britain, reassuring owners of international
financial capital.
As late as the early 1950s Cayman was still a backwater dependency of British-ruled
Jamaica with no telephone service, limited electricity supplies, no piped water,
a heavy reliance on seaman’s remittances, and no banks. According to the Cayman
Financial Review, mosquitoes were sometimes thick enough in the air to
suffocate cows.
By the late 1950s, things
began to change fast. An academic account explains:
Caymanians began to consider a model based on Bermuda and the Bahamas’
nascent tax and exchange control avoidance businesses, Curaçao’s “ring-fenced”
tax regime benefitting from the extension of the U.S.-Netherlands tax treaty to
the Netherlands Antilles, and the tax structuring business in the Channel
Islands and Europe generally.
. . .
The British side of such transactions was already well developed: British banks and financial firms had more than a century of international operations, with experience to develop techniques ‘only acquired by the inherited aptitudes and many years of experience’. The City [of London] had also developed considerable expertise navigating regulatory thickets.[i]
. . .
The British side of such transactions was already well developed: British banks and financial firms had more than a century of international operations, with experience to develop techniques ‘only acquired by the inherited aptitudes and many years of experience’. The City [of London] had also developed considerable expertise navigating regulatory thickets.[i]
More surprisingly,
perhaps, it seems that the promise of offshore financial service revenues were themselves
a spur to Cayman’s decision to separate from Jamaica in 1959:
For Cayman to enter this business would require new legal
infrastructure, however, and as Caymanians explicitly feared, legislation at
the Federation level could prevent it should Cayman joined [sic] the Federation.
The Cayman Companies Law in 1960, written by a Jamaican law firm and
passed “as written” by the UK Colonial Office (p22), was
designed with offshore business in mind. It was modelled closely on English
company law, but, as a local registrar commented:
What really started the ball a-rolling were the bits of legislation
offering tax concessions, and the idea that we could have a company separate
from the individual, that he could shield behind the [company name].”
In other words,
offshore tax and secrecy facilities.
One person who attended the launch of the Companies Act was James MacDonald,
a Canadian lawyer who soon became a resident and began aggressively to promote
its tax facilities overseas. And
indeed, from the 1960s it was not only British but also Canadian interests that
played an especially important early role in pushing an ‘offshore’ model. The first banks in Cayman with a retail
presence were Barclays and the Royal Bank of Canada; Cayman’s first trust
company, followed by the Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Company (Cayman), then the
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC).
Jamaica’s independence from Britain in 1962 provided Cayman with an
early boost, as many international business interests active in Jamaica shifted
to Cayman, attracted by the continued bedrock of the ongoing link with Britain
as the mother country, not to mention Cayman’s more harmonious politics and
race relations. A mosquito control programme made the islands more liveable,
and infrastructure followed: the airport was expanded to let jet aircraft land,
and the electricity and telephone networks were soon upgraded.
Over time, Britain’s colonial powers directly to control economic development in Cayman gave way to a greater degree of constitutional autonomy - in contrast to France, whose post-colonial overseas territories remained integral parts of the French state without the ability to set up their own independent and ‘offshore’ legislative frameworks. British decolonisation more broadly provided a further push to Cayman, as one account explains:
Over time, Britain’s colonial powers directly to control economic development in Cayman gave way to a greater degree of constitutional autonomy - in contrast to France, whose post-colonial overseas territories remained integral parts of the French state without the ability to set up their own independent and ‘offshore’ legislative frameworks. British decolonisation more broadly provided a further push to Cayman, as one account explains:
The post-war push for decolonization created the political space needed
. . . by reducing British control and empowering interests within the British
government which focused on the territories’ economic sustainability rather
than on the impact “tax havenry” might have on the British Treasury.[ii]
The impact of ‘tax havenry’ on other countries, rich and poor, was of no
concern - as Bank of England internal correspondence (p108) illustrates:
“there is of course no objection to their
providing bolt holes for non-residents.”
Cayman got its first chartered accountant in 1967, alongside an attorney
called William S. Walker, who came to Cayman from Canada after finding it to be
“just like the Bahamas, but new
and better.” Walker helped draft trust legislation which, as a UK official
later said, “blatantly seeks to frustrate our own law for dealing with our own
taxpayers.” The Cambridge-educated Walker
and the Oxford-educated lawyer John Maples (later to become a British
Conservative MP) and their respective firms were instrumental in bringing
British clients to Cayman: as the Cayman Financial Review put it: “between
Walker and Maples, they had access to most of the influential business people
in London.” Increasingly, Cayman was becoming important in helping City of
London businesses escape exchange control regulations, and also played a part in
spurring the growth of the offshore, unregulated Eurodollar markets based in
London.
In 1967 another external event boosted Cayman when the Bahamas, awash
with U.S. Mob money, got its first black premier, Lynden Pindling. Skittish
financial capital owners, already worried about the Cuban threat nearby, and with
rising racial tensions in the Bahamas and the prospect for full independence
(which came in 1973) looming, began to shift their attention to Cayman, with
its reassuring bedrock of the link to London. Milton Grundy, another architect
of Cayman’s early offshore laws, explained the impact of Pindling’s election (p106).
“It wasn’t that Pindling said or did
anything to damage the banks,” he said, “it was just that he was black.”
As Bahamas business moved in, a solidly British and Canadian offshore
sector began to attract a more pan-American clientèle, including more Latin
American money. Top names in international law, such as Marshall Langer, began
to promote the Caymans in the U.S. – helped by the fact that Miami is just one
hour’s flight away.
A new constitution in 1972, entrenching the Privy Council in London as
the final appeal court, solidified the British link but also gave Cayman more
scope for self-governance and therefore for creating its own offshore
legislation with less input from London.
Cayman’s prime offering was made explicitly clear from the outset. In
the words of Sir Vassal Johnson (p150), who became
Cayman Financial Secretary in 1968, the principle behind the offshore industry
was “to afford international investors a legitimate expectation of a level of
privacy . . . void of tax deductions in the Cayman Islands.”
But there was, at the time, what one British government team (p107) called a
“frightening lack of local expertise,” which enabled skilled lawyers and
accountants to get what they wanted without any queries from inexperienced local
legislators. Vassall Johnson said in 1973 that the islands did not have a
single economist, and added: “we have written away to the United Nations
to get one.”
For a while, the
Cayman Islands’ offshore centre was something of a free-for-all. Drugs profits
and other nefarious money flew in by the planeload; if there was enough of it,
it would get a police escort to the bank.
Time magazine in 1973 cited an investment banker who explained the
islands’ attraction succinctly: “We like the place because it is suitably
devoid of law.”
Following the 1960
Companies Law, Cayman worked hard to expand its offshore offerings, to create
new offshore sectors. The Trusts Law of 1966 was next, based on British and
Liechtenstein law; this was followed by laws including the Banks and Trust
Companies Regulation law of 1968, based on Bahamian legislation; a new
insurance law in 1979, and the Mutual Funds law in 1993.
While democratic local debate on other legislation was often vigorous, the offshore laws were typically passed with “virtually no debate” (e.g. p41) highlighting the strong degree of ‘capture’ of the jurisdiction by the offshore financial services industry, as we have seen in numerous offshore centres. One common feature of this capture is what has been called, in Cayman’s case, “the usual solidarity over measures to protect the financial industry” (p62) and what Michael Austin, one of the first accountants on Cayman, calls “a hugely friendly relationship between the government and the private sector.” In essence, the government would create the laws that the private sector practitioners asked for. This is formalised in a "Private Sector Consultative Committee”, a structure set up in the 1960s where private sector operators discuss the legislation they needed, and typically write it for Cayman – with relatively little substantive input from Cayman civil servants – and almost never any dissent from London (p120).
While democratic local debate on other legislation was often vigorous, the offshore laws were typically passed with “virtually no debate” (e.g. p41) highlighting the strong degree of ‘capture’ of the jurisdiction by the offshore financial services industry, as we have seen in numerous offshore centres. One common feature of this capture is what has been called, in Cayman’s case, “the usual solidarity over measures to protect the financial industry” (p62) and what Michael Austin, one of the first accountants on Cayman, calls “a hugely friendly relationship between the government and the private sector.” In essence, the government would create the laws that the private sector practitioners asked for. This is formalised in a "Private Sector Consultative Committee”, a structure set up in the 1960s where private sector operators discuss the legislation they needed, and typically write it for Cayman – with relatively little substantive input from Cayman civil servants – and almost never any dissent from London (p120).
The offshore sector is
also deliberately ring-fenced from turbulent domestic politics. An in-depth
analysis of Caymanian political history by two U.S. academics in 2013 notes how
Britain plays a part in this capture:
“The checks-and-balances maintained through the British Governor and the
Caymanian civil service removed much of the regulatory system from direct
political pressures. Moreover, the independent judiciary led by the Chief
Justice possessed autonomy, with final appellate review lodged, as it had been
throughout colonial history, in the Privy Council” (p57)
From early on in the
sector’s development, its effects were felt elsewhere, helping set the stage
for today’s towering inequalities in countries around the world. The same analysis
continues:
“As the Labour Party in Britain was increasingly focusing on efforts to
tax passive income, British wealth was passing “outside the more exposed forms
of individual title and instead through the more elusive and labyrinthine
network of trusts.”
Scandals began to surface too. A Canadian banker, Jean Doucet, set up
the International Bank and began mailing out pamphlets about Cayman to tens of
thousands of clients worldwide. Chris Johnson, a local accountant, wrote a
qualified audit report on Doucet’s businesses that he said was “basically
telling the government to close the bank down” – but instead he was fired.
Doucet became the largest employer on the islands, threw lavish parties and
must have felt untouchable. When his financial empire collapse in 1974 he fled
to Monaco, from where he was later extradited to Cayman and convicted.
Other countries, noticing Cayman’s increasing ability to undermine their
own laws and tax systems, began increasingly to complain. Cayman’s response was
always essentially the same – as it is today – denial of wrongdoing. Assisting
in tax evasion, Vassall Johnson said piously in 1975, was “unethical.”
Just weeks after he said that, U.S. authorities at Miami airport served
a subpoena on Anthony Field, managing director of Cayman-based Castle Bank and
Trust, on suspicion of assisting U.S. clients evade taxes. Before a Florida Grand Jury, Field
refused to divulge client details, saying he would breach confidentiality laws
in Cayman - and to bolster his case, Cayman defiantly passed a new law, the
Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law reinforcing banking secrecy. Under
this law, people can go to jail not only for divulging information, but merely
for asking for it. An
outright challenge to the U.S., it remains in place today, a powerful secrecy
mechanism.
The growing surge of petrodollars into world markets, in the 1970s, combined
with an end to exchange controls and the growth of the Euromarkets,
dramatically increased the scale and scope of the global financial services
industries, some of which spilled into Cayman. By 1980, it hosted an estimated
$30 billion in Eurodollars, some three percent of the world total, and on a par
with Hong Kong and Bahrain (p28 and p41).
As the U.S. and other countries increasingly sought to push back against
Cayman’s harmful secrecy offerings, Cayman responded with a three-pronged
strategy.
The first was to mount a public relations campaign, which was already in
full swing by the 1970s. Cayman monotonously described itself as a ‘legitimate
financial centre’ and “not a tax haven.” Yet the essential model remained intact: the
attraction of foreign money, with plenty of secrecy and few questions asked.
“What we sell is confidentiality; they can’t match it,” a banker said in 1981.
Vassall Johnson described secrecy as “the prime support of the country, of
promoting the tax haven business.”
The second prong in the strategy was to concede narrow exemptions to its
secrecy. Typically, a scandal or outside pressure would result in incremental
reforms, often tailored only to the particular concerns raised, and often only
designed to address (and then typically only in part) the concerns of the
particular (usually powerful) country that had made the complaint. The
signature of a narcotics agreement with the U.S. in 1984, then a tripartite
U.S.-UK-Cayman Mutual Legal Assistance treaty in July 1986, were early steps in
tackling some of the most outrageous drugs (and other) crimes committed via
Caymans – though these still left doors wide open for criminals, particularly
from outside the US and UK.
The third prong was to move upmarket while seeking to expand its offshore
offerings, to become somewhat less reliant on secrecy, and to develop offshore
financial regulatory approaches. The focus began to shift beyond private client
business towards more institutional investors. Insurance companies began to
appear from the 1970s, followed by offshore investment funds in the 1980s,
often in search of ways to escape exchange controls and for tax advantages. Tax avoidance, as opposed
to wholly illegal evasion, was also actively marketed.
Yet even as Cayman moved upmarket, secrecy and tax always remained a
part of the package, to the present day. Many Cayman-incorporated
Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs), for instance, serve as vehicles for tax
avoidance and evasion on the part of some investors – though this is often not
the prime reason.
The breaking open of the Bank of Credit and Commerce (BCCI,) in large
part by New York District Attorney Robert Morgenthau and (now TJN senior
adviser) Jack Blum in 1991, opened up what was must have been the most corrupt
bank in global history. With its fingers in in heroin trafficking, arms dealing
to terrorist regime, wholesale corruption on a global scale, the deliberate
bribery and subversion of governments and much, much more, BCCI concealed its
crimes by splitting itself three ways: it had its headquarters in London, and its
two main operating subsidiaries in Luxembourg and Cayman. This split evaded
centralised regulation - and when the balloon went up - allowed officials in
Cayman and Luxembourg to point fingers elsewhere.
Other legislation in the 1990s, notably on money-laundering, helped
mitigate but not eliminate the taint from more egregious financial crimes. The
legislation could pierce Cayman’s Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law
– but only in limited
circumstances: international bodies have continued to cite money
laundering concerns, as the sections below explain. The setting up of the Cayman Islands Monetary
Authority in the early 1990s, a response to the BCCI scandal, was designed to
help remove some of the taint; its independence from local politics has helped
insulate it from periodic corruption scandals.
Light-touch
financial regulation
Cayman’s tradition has been for minimal regulation, hiding behind the
argument that supposedly ‘sophisticated’ investors can look after themselves
and that ‘the markets’ always know best. Until the Mutual Funds Law of 1993,
for example, there were no laws regulating funds. Eduardo d’Angeolo Silva,
president of the Cayman Islands Bankers Association, said in 2000 that
laws to curb criminality were, in effect, ‘self regulating.’ Anthony Travers,
later a chairman of the Cayman Islands Monetary authority, explained:
“the only effective regulatory mechanism with respect to the
sophisticated institutional business that Cayman attracted . . . was a caveat emptor [buyer beware] system. . .
the responsibility of the Cayman government was managed by avoiding the concept
of prudential regulation.”
Cayman’s responsibilities to others, it seems, were shrugged off,
leaving people elsewhere to pick up the tab when things went wrong.
Other scandals implicating Cayman – including the discovery that the
fraudulent U.S. energy company Enron had used hundreds of unregulated Cayman
subsidiaries to keep billions off its balance sheet; or where the bankrupt U.S.
telecoms giant MCI/WorldCom used Cayman companies to hide losses; and a scandal
involving the disgraced Italian firm Parmalat – continued to surface. But their
nature – based more on regulatory laxity than on secrecy – highlight the change
from the days of BCCI, when the offering was more heavily secrecy-based.
The Cayman
Islands offshore centre today
Every offshore financial centre strives to portray itself as a ‘clean’, cooperative
and transparent jurisdiction – and Cayman is no exception. Its officials repeat
this claim routinely and point, among other things, to Cayman’s white listing
by the OECD. Yet as we have explained in great
detail elsewhere, the white lists are is little more than fig leaves
of only limited
use, and Cayman only cooperates when under severe duress.
Still, Cayman is undoubtedly ‘cleaner’ than some other secrecy jurisdictions,
and on our ranking of pure
secrecy scores it is only in 47th place among 82 jurisdictions. What
is more, its secrecy score has improved from 77 in our last index to 70 this
time, a welcome improvement. Cayman reacts more quickly than many jurisdictions
to international pressures – though not always in desirable ways: when it is
not pro-actively complying, it is seeking to find clever ways to sidestep new
pressures, and sometimes even to profit from offering avenues for financial
players to sidestep them. The approach of the European Union’s pioneering
Savings Tax Directive is a case in point: one account drawn from official
documents summarises the approach as:
“an aggressive strategy of negotiation and threats of litigation to
secure the best terms it could with respect to the Directive.” (p53)
As Cayman has moved upmarket, it has squeezed out many of the most
egregious forms of money laundering, replacing them with more complex strategies
involving sophisticated institutional players, though typically on the basis of
‘softer’ yet still harmful offshore offerings such as lax financial regulation
and tolerance of tax avoidance. When defending itself, Cayman repeatedly points
at other jurisdictions such as the City of London and Delaware, to argue that
their regulations and laws are often equally full of holes: there is some merit
in this argument.
Further
reading:
-
History of the Cayman Islands, in six parts, Cayman
Financial Review.
-
Creating Cayman as an Offshore Financial Center: Structure &
Strategy since 1960,
Tony Freyer, Andrew P. Morriss, Arizona State Law Journal, 2013. While almost
wholly uncritical and pro-tax haven, it nevertheless contains a wealth of
interesting data, analysis and original source material.
-
Treasure Islands, particularly
pp103-121 in the UK edition, which provides much political context, and explores
some of the subtleties of the relationship with Britain.
-
The UK narrative
report provides background about the Overseas Territories and Crown
Dependencies.
-
The Cayman database
report for our index
provides more on the secrecy jurisdiction.
[i] Freyer, Morriss, pp11-12
[ii] See Creating Cayman as an Offshore Financial
Center: Structure & Strategy since 1960, Tony Freyer, Andrew P.
Morriss, Arizona State Law Journal, 2013, p4
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